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Abstract
A society facing a choice problem has also to choose the voting rule itself from a set of
different possible voting rules. In such situations, the consequentialism property allows us to
induce voters’ preferences on voting rules from preferences over alternatives. A voting rule
employed to resolve the society’s choice problem is self-selective if it chooses itself when it
is also used in choosing the voting rule. A voting rules set is said to be stable if it contains at
least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider
in this paper a society which will make a choice from a set constituted by three alternatives {a,
b, c} and a set of the three well-known scoring voting rules {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality}.
Under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption (IAC), we will derive a probability for
the stability of this triplet of voting rules. We use Ehrhart polynomials in order to solve
our problems. This method counts the number of lattice points inside a convex bounded
polyhedron (polytope). We discuss briefly recent algorithmic solutions to this method and use
it to determine the probability of stabillity of {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality} set.
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1 Introduction
Within the social choice theory framework, one always considers a society which seeks to define
the collective choice upon the individuals’ preferences. That can be regarded like an ”ordinary”
choice level.
The aim of this paper is to imagine a situation such that the individuals composing the society
also have choices to make on the voting rules themselves that will be used in making the ordinary-
level choice. In other words, the way of choosing (the voting rule) is itself an option of the set
from which the society must make a choice.
Such a situation was introduced for the first time in the social choice literature by Koray [20]
together with the notion of Self-selectivity. A voting rule is Self-selective if, when it is used to
make a choice from a given voting rules set, it chooses itself against any rule. The self-selective
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rule is equivalent to the undominated rule. Thus, the characteristic of self-selectivity depends on
two elements: the other rules in the set, and individuals’ preferences.
To illustrate this concept, let us consider two examples. Imagine that the votes are made
according to the majority rule: The majority decision is self-selective when there is a majority
favorable to the majority voting rule. On the other hand, if a dictator is favorable to the majority
voting rule, his dictatorship is not self-selective. This exactly what happened in Spain: After
the General Franco’s death, the King Carlos asked for a new constitution in order to establish a
democracy.
The self-selective notion also makes possible the introduction of a new concept if we focus on
the voting rules set. The second principle introduced here is the stability of voting rules set which
can be defined as follows: A voting rules set is (weakly) stable if it has at least one self-selective
element whatever the individuals’ preferences. We say that this set satisfies the stability axiom.
We will illustrate this definition by simple examples in the following sections.
The researchers in self-selectivity are divided into consequentialists and non-consequentialists.
The first group assumes a complete information about preferences of others and that, given a profile
and a set of social choice rules, the voters form their preferences on the set of rules estimating the
consequences of their application, i.e. comparing the alternatives that these rules would select if
implemented. The second group, mainly represented by Diss and Merlin [10] and Houy [17, 18,
19], rejects consequentialism and propose the so-called stability of a voting rules set.
Consequentialists can be also of different kinds, those who allow comparisons of only two
rules (the status quo and another rule representing change), like in Barbera` and Jackson [2] and
Barbera` and Bevia` [1], and those who allow many rules compared at once particularly in Koray
[20] and Koray and Unel [21].
Our paper aims to highlight the notion of the stability of voting rules set by proposing an
application of these new axiom to a set composed by three scoring voting rules and especially by
considering the consequentialism property. We propose in this paper to deal with the three most
well-known rules in this category: the Borda rule (B), the Plurality rule (P) and the Antiplurality
rule (A). During this work, we will try to answer the following question: is the set {B, P, A} stable
? In other words does there always exist a self-selective rule in this set whatever the individuals’
preferences are ? We will show initially that this set can be not stable. Next, we will evaluate the
probability of the set’s stability when the number of voters tends to infinity.
Our society here is assumed to be endowed with a preference profile on three alternatives
{a, b, c} and to have a set {B, P, A} to make its choice of a voting rule. Consequentialism property
[20, 21] stipulates that if each voter’s preferences on {a, b, c} are represented by a linear order,
then our voters will rank the available voting rules in {B, P, A} in accordance with what they will
choose from {a, b, c}.
Note that before calculating the probability that the set {B, P, A} is stable we need to define
a probability model for all voters types. There are two standard models to be found in the social
choice literature: the so-called Impartial Culture (IC) assumption and the Impartial Anonymous
Culture (IAC) assumption. In this paper we take into account the latter one. This model was
proposed for the first time in the literature by Gehrlein and Fishburn [14] in 1976. We will give
more details on this assumption in the following section.
Under the IAC hypothesis on voter preferences, the involved calculations amount simply to
count the number of points with integer coordinates inside a set that is characterized by linear
equations and inequalities. The variables are usually the numbers of voters with each of the m!
possible preference orders, where m is the number of alternatives. The probability calculations of
the {B, P, A} stability will be done by using the ”Ehrhart polynomials” method. This new method
was recently introduced in the social choice literature by Lepelley, Louichi and Smaoui [22] and
Pritchard and Wilson [23].
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The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: Section 2 formalizes the first ingredient of
our paper dealing with preferences, scoring voting rules and the stability notion. In Section 3, we
present Ehrhart’s polynomial theory and we use it to determine the probability’s stability of {B, P,
A} set. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Basic notions
2.1 Voting on alternatives
The voting rules considered in this paper are all scoring rules. In a scoring rule, each voter’s choice
must be a vector that specifies the number of points that the voter gives to each alternative. We will
focus in this paper on three rules: the Borda rule (B), the Plurality rule (P) and the Antiplurality
rule (A). For Borda rule, for each voter, a candidate receives 2 points if it is ranked first by the
voter, 1 point if it is ranked second and 0 if it is ranked third. The Plurality rule is the scoring
rule with the vector (1, 0, 0) and finally the Antiplurality rule is the scoring rule with the vector
(1, 1, 0). For all these rules, the score of a candidate is the total number of points the candidate
receives and the winner is the one who receives the highest number of points.
Then, let a society of n (n → ∞) individuals that is to choose one alternative among the set
{a, b, c}. In addition, the individuals’ preferences on {a, b, c} should always be complete, strict
and transitive. Therefore there are 6 types of preferences numbered from 1 to 6 in Table 1, ni
being the number of voters having the preferences number i. For example, a  b  c (n1) means
that n1 individuals prefer a to b, which is preferred to c.
Table 1: All types of preferences among {a, b, c}
a  b  c (n1) a  c  b (n2) c  a  b (n3)
c  b  a (n4) b  c  a (n5) b  a  c (n6)
The existence or not, of a self-selective rule will be determined by the study of the situation
represented by the positive integer vector n˜ = (n1, ..., n6) which points out the number of voters
according to the preferences order such that
∑6
i=1 ni = n. Then, we will have the following
scores (Table 2), where SR(n˜, x) is the score of alternative x with the rule R for the profile n˜:
Table 2: The scores
R = A R = B R = P
SR(n˜, a) n1 + n2 + n3 + n6 2(n1 + n2) + (n3 + n6) n1 + n2
SR(n˜, b) n5 + n6 + n1 + n4 2(n5 + n6) + (n1 + n4) n5 + n6
SR(n˜, c) n3 + n4 + n2 + n5 2(n3 + n4) + (n2 + n5) n3 + n4
2.2 Voting on Rules
Our society here is assumed to be endowed with a preference profile on {a, b, c} and to have a set
of three scoring voting rules {B, P, A} available to make its choices. Consequentialism property
illustrates that if each voter’s preferences on {a, b, c} are represented by a linear order, the voters
in this society are naturally expected to rank the voting rules in accordance with their preferences
on {a, b, c}. This induces a preference profile on {B, P, A} which will be complete preorders since
an agent will be indifferent between two voting rules choosing the same alternative from {a, b, c}.
3
Example 1 Consider an example with three alternatives {a, b, c} and 41 voters.
a  b  c (10) a  c  b (10) c  a  b (10) c  b  a (8) b  c  a (3)
The Antiplurality rule selects the outcome b, the Borda count picks out a and finally the
Plurality rule selects a. Using the consequentialism property, the complete preorder on {B, P,
A} is represented as follows:
A  B ∼ P (21) B ∼ P  A (20)
Where A  B ∼ P means that individuals prefer A to B, which is equal to P .
For this reason we can find in the social choice literature two different principles to decide
between the voting rules in such situations.
2.3 Extensions
For any −1 ≤ s ≤ 1, let us consider the following family of points vector Ws = (2, 1 + s, 0);
This vector describes all the possible scoring rules for the case of 3 options. In particular, Ws is
the Plurality rule for s = −1, the Borda rule for s = 0 and the Antiplurality rule if s = 1.
Principle 1 When individuals are indifferent between two voting rules, all the scoring rules are
similar: they give 1 point for the rule(s) ranked first and 0 point for the rule(s) classed last.
Principle 2 When individuals are indifferent between two voting rules, the vector Ws = (2, 1 +
s, 0) is transformed to W
′
s = (
3+s
2 ,
3+s
2 , 0) if there were a tie in the first position and to W
′′
s =
(2, 1+s2 ,
1+s
2 ) if there were a tie in the last position.
For the example 1, applying Principle 1, Borda, Plurality and Antiplurality are similar in the
sense that their points vector is always (1, 0) ( 1 point for the option(s) ranked first and 0 for the
alternative(s) ordered second). Then, applying these rules for the preference A  B ∼ P , while
Antiplurality will receive 1 point, Borda and Plurality get 0 point. However, for the preference
B ∼ P  A, Borda and Plurality obtain 1 point and Antiplurality receives 0 point. By this way,
for this example, Antiplurality gets 21 points and Borda and Plurality will receive 20 points.
By contrast, applying Principle 2, for the preference A  B ∼ P the points vector will
be W
′′
0 = (2,
1
2 ,
1
2) for Borda, W
′′
−1 = (2, 0, 0) for Plurality and finally W
′′
1 = (2, 1, 1) for
Antiplurality. Whereas for the preference B ∼ P  A, the points vector is W ′0 = (32 , 32 , 0)
for Borda, W
′
−1 = (1, 1, 0) for Plurality and W
′
1 = (2, 2, 0) for Antiplurality. According to these
vectors, Borda selects Antiplurality, Plurality picks out Antiplurality. Finally Antiplurality chooses
Borda and Plurality.
Note that, we don’t need to use a principle to decide between voting rules in the case that
individuals are indifferent between three options in the sense that for this case we will show that
the studied set will always be stable, provided that we break ties in favor of status quo.
2.4 Definition of the stability
We will now present the definition of stability and apply it to the triplet {B, P, A}. Under the
hypothesis of a universal domain, if one proposes to a society a set of neutral and different
voting rules, would we be sure that the preferences will lead to a self-selective rule chosen by
the individuals ? In a global aspect, the notion of stability concerns the choice of one rule among
many of them, independent of initial preferences. Moreover, on applying this notion, one rule may
be considered as preferred to another if it is more stable within a given initial set of voting rules.
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Definition 1 Consider a voting rules set E and a complete preorder on these voting rules induced
by the preferences on the alternatives. A voting rule R ∈ E is self-selective, at some profile, if it
sustains itself against any rule R
′ ∈ E. That is, when the rule R is used to choose between the
rules in E.
Definition 2 The set E is (weakly) stable if, at any profile, there exists at least one self-selective
voting rule.
Let us consider three examples to highlight these ideas.
Example 2 Consider 3 alternatives {a, b, c}, 11 voters and the preference profile such that:
b  c  a (3) b  a  c (2) c  a  b (2) a  c  b (4)
For this example, the application of the Borda rule gives out the outcome a. The Plurality rule
selects b and finally the Antiplurality rule chooses c. Then, the complete preorder on {B, P, A} is
represented as follows:
P  A  B (3) P  B  A (2) A  B  P (2) B  A  P (4)
Then, the three rules composing the set are self-selective in the sense that Borda selects
Borda, Plurality opts for Plurality and finally the Antiplurality rule selects Antiplurality. However,
example 3 shows that the {B,P,A} may be not stable for Principle 2.
Example 3 Consider the preference profile displayed in Example 1. The complete preorder on
{B, P, A} is represented as follows:
A  B ∼ P (21) B ∼ P  A (20)
The three rules composing the set are not self-selective in the sense that Borda selects Antiplurality,
Plurality opts for Antiplurality and finally the Antiplurality rule selects Plurality and Borda with
a tie.
Example 4 Consider 3 alternatives {a, b, c}, 5 voters and the preference profile represented as
follows:
b  c  a (2) b  a  c (2) c  b  a (1)
For this example, the application of each scoring rule (in {B, P, A}) gives out the outcome b.
Then, considering the consequentialism property, the individuals complete preorder on {B, P, A}
corresponds to:
A ∼ B ∼ P (5)
Society is indifferent on the three voting scoring rules and then, by breaking a tie in favor of the
status quo, each time there is a self-selective rule in the set {B, P, A}.
Thus, our objective is to try to calculate the stability’s probability of this set of 3 voting rules
under the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) hypothesis. To fulfill this programme, we must first
enumerate all the possible relationships among the three alternatives.
3 Probability computation
First, we define the conceptual framework of our paper. The well-known Impartial Anonymous
Culture (IAC) assumption stipulates that all voting situations n˜ are equiprobable. For n agents and
m alternatives, the total number of voting situations is Cnn+m!−1. Using a simple calculation, for n
agents and 3 alternatives, the number of voting situations is given by the fifth-degree polynomial
below: ψ(n) = 1120n
5 + 18n
4 + 1724n
3 + 158 n
2 + 13760 n+ 1.
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3.1 The Different Cases
In this study, we will first assume that the size of the population is large, which will make the
probabilities of tied outcomes on {a, b, c} extremely unlikely. Thus, the application of each rule
to the {a, b, c} set gives only three possible results (a alone, b alone or c alone ). In fact, we will
obtain (3)3 = 27 possible cases (Table 3).
Table 3: All possible cases
Case B P A
1 a b c
2 a c b
3 b a c
4 b c a
5 c a b
6 c b a
Table 3.a: Category I
Case B P A
7 a a b
8 a a c
9 b b a
10 b b c
11 c c a
12 c c b
Table 3.b: Category II
Case B P A
13 a b a
14 a c a
15 b a b
16 b c b
17 c a c
18 c b c
Table 3.c: Category III
Case B P A
19 b a a
20 c a a
21 a b b
22 c b b
23 a c c
24 b c c
Table 3.d: Category IV
Case B P A
25 a a a
26 b b b
27 c c c
Table 3.e: Category V
3.1.1 Case 1 in detail
Let us consider, for example, the inequalities that characterize the first case. Since B gives a, P
gives b and A gives c, the domains of profile leading to these results is represented by:

n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
−n3 − n4 + n5 + n6 > 0
−n1 − n2 + n5 + n6 > 0
−n1 + n4 + n5 − n6 > 0
−n1 + n2 + n3 − n6 > 0
(1)
Using the consequentialism property, the complete preorder on {B, P, A} is represented as
follows:
B  P  A (n1) B  A  P (n2) A  B  P (n3)
A  P  B (n4) P  A  B (n5) P  B  A (n6)
Taking into account the inequalities in (1), we can easily find that the three rules are self-
selective. This is true using either Principle 1 or Principle 2. Then calculating the probability of
the stability of this case is only tantamount to computing the solution of the system (1). We can
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easily show that this case is similar to the cases from 2 to 6 in the sense that Borda, Plurality and
Antiplurality are always self-selective.
3.1.2 Case 7 in detail
This case denotes a voting situation with n voters for which Borda and Plurality choose a and
Antiplurality selects b. The conditions for such a situation are written as follows:

n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
n1 + n2 − n5 − n6 > 0
n1 + n2 − n3 − n4 > 0
n1 − n3 − n4 + n6 > 0
−n2 − n3 + n4 + n5 > 0
(2)
Applying the consequentialism assumption, the complete preorder on {B, P, A} is represented
in the following profile:
A  B ∼ P (n4 + n5 + n6) B ∼ P  A (n1 + n2 + n3)
Let n1 + n2 + n3 = α and n4 + n5 + n6 = n − α. Let us use the second Principle.
SP (n˜, B) = SP (n˜, P ) = α2 , SP (n˜, A) = n − α, thus Plurality is self-selective if α > 2n3 .
Applying Borda we find SB(n˜, B) = SB(n˜, P ) = 0.5n + α, SB(n˜, A) = 2n − 2α and the
Borda rule is self-selective if α > n2 . Similarly, we find that Antiplurality is self-selective if α <
n
3 .
Taking into account these conditions, we can show that no rule is self-selective if n3 < α <
n
2 .
Outside this interval {B, P, A} set is stable in the sense that at least one rule is self-selective.
Then calculating the stability of {B, P, A} when Borda and Plurality give a and Antiplurality
chooses c is equivalent to computing the solution of the system (2) with two added inequalities
n1 + n2 + n3 > n3 and n1 + n2 + n3 <
n
2 . Similarly, for every case of category II, finding the
probability of the stability of {B, P, A} set is always equivalent to solve a system of 8 inequalities.
3.1.3 Case 13 in detail
For this case, Borda gives a, Plurality selects b and Antiplurality chooses a. The system of
inequalities of such situation is given as follows:

n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
−n1 − n2 + n5 + n6 > 0
−n3 − n4 + n5 + n6 > 0
n2 + n3 − n4 − n5 > 0
n1 − n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
(3)
Then, the society will have the following preferences on the voting scoring rules:
A ∼ B  P (n1 + n2 + n3) P  A ∼ B (n4 + n5 + n6)
Let n1+n2+n3 = α and n4+n5+n6 = n−α. Using simple mathematical tools we find that
the {B, P, A} set is stable in the sense that at least one rule is self-selective. This is true using either
Principle 1 or Principle 2. Then, to determine the probability of the cases described in category
III, we should only solve systems of 6 inequalities in the sense that introducing consequentialism
does not affect the probability of these cases.
7
3.1.4 Other cases
Notice that with the help of elementary mathematical operations, we can easily demonstrate that
the cases described in category IV are impossible. Also, for the cases in category V, using either
Principle 1 or Principle 2, the {B, P, A} set is always stable in the sense that employing the
consequentialism property, society will be indifferent on the three voting scoring rules and then
there is always a self-selective rule in the set.
Using these considerations we can first give the following proposition for Principle 1.
Proposition 1 Consider elections using scoring rules systems for which there are three candidates
and n voters, and for which society will choose the voting rule itself among {Borda, Plurality,
Antiplurality} set. Assume that all voting situations are equally likely (IAC). Under Principle 1,
the {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality} set is stable for all the profiles.
For Principle 2 we have to solve all systems illustrated above. The Ehrhart polynomials theory
will allow us to count the number of solutions for each system.
3.2 Ehrhart Polynomials
We will not explain Ehrhart theory and attached algorithms in detail but we will try to give a
brief description of its main results. For more information we recommend the paper of Lepelley,
Louichi and Smaoui [22].
The basic idea is that all sets of voting situations that are of interest in our paper can be
characterized by linear equations and inequalities. The set of such (in)equalities defines a convex
polytope that can be described by a set of linear contraints, i.e., P = {x ∈ Zd|Ax + b ≥ 0} or
P = {x ∈ Qd|Ax + b ≥ 0} ∩ Zd. The extremal points of such polytopes are called its vertices.
The calculations involved amount simply to find the number of points in P which is equivalent to
counting the number of integer lattice points inside the convex polytope.
In the 1960’s Euge`ne Ehrhart [13] showed that for any rational d-polytope P , the number of
integer points in the dilatation nP = {nx|x ∈ P} on a rational polytope P can be represented
by a pseudo-polynomial (aka, Ehrhart polynomial) L(P, n) in n. The degree of L(P, n) is less
than or equal to the dimension of P . The coefficients of L(P, n) are periodic numbers, which
means that they depend periodically on the parameter n. Basically, the periodic numbers can be
represented by a n-dimensional lookup-table Un = U [n mod s], where s is called the period of
Un. The periods of the coefficients are all less or equal to the lcm (least common multiple) of the
denominators of the vertices. In particular, if P is an integral polytope, L(P, n) is a polynomial.
Note that the coefficient of the leading term is always independent of n and is equal to the
Euclidean volume of P . Knowledge of this coefficient is very important and sufficient in our paper
in the sense that the limiting probability under IAC as n→∞ is simply the volume of P divided
by the total number of all possible voting situations ψ(n) = 1120n
5+ 18n
4+ 1724n
3+ 158 n
2+ 13760 n+1.
To our knowledge, there exist two famous methods for computing Ehrhart polynomials: Clauss’s
algorithm (1998) and the parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm (2004).
Based on the structure of the Ehrhart polynomials, Clauss and Loechner [8] developed an
algorithm to compute the Ehrhart quasi-polynomials. They calculate the number of points in a set
of instances of P for fixed values of n in a given validity domain, called initial countings, and
then calculate the Ehrhart polynomial for this validity domain through interpolation. During this
calculation, they directly determine the elements in the lookup-tables representing the periodic
numbers. In order to interpolate an Ehrhart polynomials of degree d in n parameters with period
s,
∏n
i=1(d+ 1)si instances are needed.
This leads to the first disadvantages of the interpolation method which has been explicitly
mentioned by Turjan et al.[9]. If a hyperrectangle instance with the required integer size vector
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does not exist, the validity domain is called ”degenerate”, and the algorithm fails to compute
the Ehrhart quasi-polynomial. The implementation of Clauss’s method uses some heuristics to
circumvent the problem of degenerate domains. These heuristics are not covering all situations in
the sense that in several applications degeneracy is an occurring problem.
The second disadvantage of this method concern the time of the interpolation. Since Clauss’s
method is based on the lookup-table representation of periodic numbers, if the periods are large,
then the number of instances will be very large and the interpolation will take a long time. Also,
if any of the instances of P contains a large number of points, the computation time will increase
accordingly.
In the 1990’s, on the basis of work made by the geometers Brion, Khovanski, Lawrence, and
Pukhlikov, Barvinok [3, 4] proposed an algorithm for counting integer points inside polyhedra that
runs in polynomial time for fixed dimension and allows to solve the above problems to a large
extent. This algorithm was latter refined by De Loeara et al. [16, 15], especially with respect to
a practical implementation and began an important area of research of a wide variety of topics in
pure and applied mathematics.
The key ideas are using rational functions as efficient data structures and the unimodular signed
decomposition of polyhedra. Given a convex polyhedron P , define the multivariate generating
function attached to P as:
f(P ;x) =
∑
α∈P∩Zd
xα where xα = xα11 ...x
αd
d and x = (x1, ..., xd)
This is an infinite formal power series if P is not bounded, but if P is a polytope it is a (Laurent)
polynomial with one monomial per lattice point. The number of points in P is then simply
the number of monomials in the generating function, which can be calculated by evaluating
the generating function at 1, i.e. f(P ; 1). The generating function is obviously not constructed
enumerating all the integer points in P, but rather as a signed sum of short rational functions that
can be derived from the description of P .
Brion theorem [6] allows the evaluation of f(P ;x) by computing the generating function of
the supporting cones of P .
f(P ;x) =
∑
υ∈V (p)
f(K(P, υ);x)
where K is the supporting cone, υ is a vertex and V (P ) is the set of all vertices of P . Notice that
to apply this formula we must decompose the supporting cones to unimodular ones (determinant
= ± 1). Thus unimodular cones contains only one point. Simplifying and expending (in term of
Laurent series) the sum of all generating functions and evaluating them at x = (1, ..., 1), we
finally obtain the result of the number of lattice points in the polytope P . (See algorithms in the
appendix).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Example: case 7
The system of linear (in)equalities that characterized the instability of the {B, P, A} set in this case
is given as:
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
n1 + 2n2 + n3 − n4 − 2n5 − n6 > 0
2n1 + n2 − n3 − 2n4 − n5 + n6 > 0
n1 + n2 − n5 − n6 > 0
n1 + n2 − n3 − n4 > 0
n1 − n3 − n4 + n6 > 0
−n2 − n3 + n4 + n5 > 0
n1 + n2 + n3 > n3
n1 + n2 + n3 < n2
n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n
ni ≥ 0 for i=1, 2,...,6.
(4)
Using Barvinok’s algorithm, we obtain (for n ≥ 8) the following output:
79
3110400
n5 + [
263
622080
,
13
311040
]nn4 + [
11
5760
,
−473
311040
,
11
5760
,
−91
103680
,
197
155520
,
−91
103680
]nn3
+ [
−1
864
,
−449
155520
,
25
7776
,
−41
17280
,
−29
3888
,
311
155520
]nn2 + [
−1
120
,
6247
622080
,
149
9720
,
341
23040
,
−163
4860
,
7607
622080
]nn
+ [0,
−8867
1555200
,
−4301
64800
,
−57
6400
,
232
6075
,
−739
6912
,
−53
800
,
101941
1555200
,
263
2025
,
−481
6400
,
365
7776
,
15437
172800
,
−3
25
,
115549
1555200
,
883
64800
,
−33
256
,
−497
6075
,
−4651
172800
,
11
800
,
−84683
1555200
,
17
81
,
31
6400
,
−14203
194400
,
29261
172800
,
−1
25
,
−2843
62208
,
−6893
64800
,
−313
6400
,
−11
6075
,
−25387
172800
,
3
32
,
39733
1555200
,
182
2025
,
543
6400
,
1349
194400
,
341
6912
,
−4
25
,
53341
1555200
,
−1709
64800
,
−1081
6400
,
19
243
,
−11563
172800
,
−21
800
,
164149
1555200
,
344
2025
,
−9
256
,
−21979
194400
,
22349
172800
,
−2
25
,
−133283
1555200
,
139
2592
,
−569
6400
,
−254
6075
,
2261
172800
,
43
800
,
−899
62208
,
101
2025
,
287
6400
,
−6427
194400
,
1613
172800
]n
It means that if n → ∞ the number of solutions of this systems is 793110400n5. Notice that
without taking into account the (in)stability of the {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality} set (system 2)
and using the same algorithm, the number of solutions is 1331104n
5 when n→∞. Then the number
of stable solutions is: ( 1331104 − 793110400)n5. These relations allow us to conclude that, for large
electorates, the likelihood of the stability of {B, P, A} set in the case 7 is: (
13
31104
− 79
3110400
)n5
1
120
n5
=
4, 7106%. 1120n
5 is the total number of voting situations ψ(n) when n → ∞. The likelihood of
instability is given as follows:
79
3110400
n5
1
120
n5
= 0, 3048%
This case is similar to cases from 8 to 12. The Ehrhart’s polynomials and probabilities of other
cases can be obtained in a similar way.
3.3.2 General results
Computed values for each cases are displayed in Table 4. Table 5 represents the probability and
the number of self-selective rules (SSR) by categories.
We have defined a stable set as being a set which has at least one self-selective rule at any
profile. We can thus give the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider elections using scoring rules systems for which there are three candidates
and n voters, and for which society will choose the voting rule itself among {Borda, Plurality,
Antiplurality} set. Assume that all voting situations are equally likely (IAC). Under Principle 2,
the {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality} set is stable for 98.17% of the profiles.
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Table 4: Probability by cases under Principle 2
Cases Stability Instability
From 1 to 6 0,1984% 0%
From 7 to 12 4,7106% 0,3048%
From 13 to 18 2,7337% 0%
From 19 to 24 0% 0%
From 25 to 27 17,4383% 0%
Table 5: Probability by category under Principle 2
Categories Stability Number of SSR Instability Number of SSR
I 1,1905% always 3 0% 0
II 28,2636% at least 1 1,8288% 0
III 16,4021% at least 1 0% 0
IV 0% impossible cases 0% impossible cases
V 52,3148% at least 1 0% 0
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have illustrated one of the recently growing literature on the self-selectivity of
voting rules with a classical example. We have considered a set composed by {Borda, Plurality,
Antiplurality} under the Impartial Anonymous Culture hypothesis. The paper provides some nice
examples of profiles; for one of these all three rules are self-selective, and for the other none of
the three are self-selective. The latter profile answers the stability question for {A, B, P} in the
negative. The rest of the paper calculates the probability for stability of {A, B, P} under IAC.
From these representations, it follows that the occurrence of instability of such voting rules set can
be considered as rare (or null) in three-candidate elections.
Notice that, while we chose to work with a special case of three alternatives {a, b, c} and a set
of three voting scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality}, it is still interesting to ask questions
like: what would happen with different sets of scoring rules (Plurality with Run-off, Copeland rule,
etc.) ? Among sets of three alternatives, does expanding the number of scoring rules eventually
yield a stable set ?, etc.
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Appendix: Algorithms
(From [5, 7])
Algorithm 1: Barvinok’s algorithm
1. For each vertex vi of P
(a) Determine supporting cone, K(P, vi)
(b) Let K = K(P, vi)− vi
(c) Decompose K into unimodular cones Kj such that: [K] =
∑
j j [Kj ]
(d) For each Kj , determine f(Kj ;x)
(e) f(K(P, vi);x) =
∑
j jx
E(vi,Kj)f(Kj ;x), j ∈ {−1, 1} and E(vi,Kj) is the unique
lattice point belonging to the fundamental half-open parallelepiped corresponding to
the translated cone Kj + vi
2. f(P ;x) =
∑
vi∈D f(K(P, vi);x)
3. evaluate f(P ; 1)
Algorithm 2: Parameterized Barvinok
1. For each (parametric) vertex vi(p) of P
(a) Determine supporting cone, K(P, vi(p))
(b) Let K = K(P, vi(p))− vi(p)
(c) Decompose K into unimodular cones: [K] =
∑
j j [Kj ]
(d) For each Kj , determine f(Kj ;x)
(e) f(K(P, vi(p));x) =
∑
j jx
E(vi(p),Kj)f(Kj ;x)
2. For each validity domain D of P
(a) f(P ;x) =
∑
vi(p)∈D f(K(P, vi(p));x)
(b) evaluate f(P ; 1)
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